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Non-technical summary
Emissions trading is key to climate policy in an increasing number of countries. Besides
the emission trading system of the European Union (EU ETS), several similar systems in
China, California, Australia, and South Korea are planned or are already operating. In
reality, emission trading is often supplemented with an additional quota for renewables
in energy production. The European Union is one example of such a combined policy
regime aiming for a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and a 20% share of
renewables in energy production by 2020. This policy regime has to operate currently
under an ex-ante unforeseen economic crisis. An obvious consequence was the collapse of
the carbon price. However, this price collapse may have been amplified by the interaction
of the emission cap and the renewables quota. The static interaction between climate
and renewable policies has been discussed extensively. This paper extends this debate by
analysing the interactions between an emissions trading scheme and a renewable quota
subject to differeces in economic growth rates.
Making use of a simple partial equilibrium model, we ask how differences in medium
to long-run growth rates affect the efficiency and effectiveness of such a policy portfolio.
We model a power sector that has two abatement options. One is a relatively cheap fuel
switch from coal to gas. The other, which is more expensive, is a replacement of carbon
emitting power generation capacities with non-emitting renewables. If economic growth
is low, then emissions are low, and the fuel switch is sufficient to stay below the cap of the
ETS. However, if the ETS is combined with a minimum renewable share target, abate-
ment efforts are forced towards the more expensive use of renewables. Put differently,
the minimum renewable share target becomes particularly binding if economic growth
is low. Furthermore, prices for emission allowances become more sensitive to changes in
electricity demand if the ETS is combined with a quota for renewables. Reversely, if eco-
nomic growth is high, then electricity demand is also high, and the minimum renewable
share target becomes less binding, as energy production by renewables becomes more
and more necessary to stay below the emissions cap. If economic growth is very high
the renewable share target may also become completely ineffective, as the emissions cap
is sufficient to force the necessary switch to renewables.
Two main lessons can be derived from this analysis: First, prices for emission al-
lowances become more sensitive to changes in electricity demand if the ETS is combined
with an instrument that aims for a minimum renewable share. If policy makers value a
clear and stable carbon price signal as crucial for encouraging investments in low-carbon
technologies the combination of the two policy targets may have unintended negative
consequences. Second and following from our first lesson, we show that while the carbon
price is always lower if an ETS is combined with a renewable quota, this gap is particu-
larly pronounced if economic growth is low. This leads to additional excess costs during
situations when funds are particularly scarce and opportunity costs of climate policies
are particularly high.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Der Handel von Emissionsrechten ist ein Schlu¨sselinstrument der Klimapolitik in einer
zunehmenden Zahl von La¨ndern. Neben dem Emissionshandelssystem der Europa¨ischen
Union (EU EHS) sind a¨hnliche Systeme in China, Kalifornien, Australien und Su¨dko-
rea in Betrieb oder im Aufbau. Oftmals werden zudem neben Emissionsobergrenzen
zusa¨tzlich Quoten fu¨r den Anteil erneuerbarer Energie in der Energieproduktion gesetzt,
so wie es auch in der Europa¨ischen Union der Fall ist. Dieses beiden Politiken mu¨ßen auch
unter nicht vorhergesehenen Umsta¨nden wie der gegenwa¨rtigen Wirtschaftskrise in Eu-
ropa funktionieren. Der aktuelle Preiszerfall im Europa¨ischen Emissionshandelssystem
ist nicht nur eine Folge dieser Krise. Auch U¨berlagerungseffekte mit anderen Politikzie-
len wie der Quote fu¨r erneuerbare Energien spielen eine Rolle.
Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht diese Interaktion: Mit Hilfe eines partiellen Gle-
ichgewichtmodells werden die Wechselwirkungen zwischen Emissionshandel und Erneuer-
barenquote hinsichtlich ihrer Sensitivita¨t gegenu¨ber unterschiedlichen Wirtschaftswach-
stumsraten untersucht. Das Modell bildet einen Elektrizita¨tssektor ab, dem zwei Optio-
nen zur CO2-Vermeidung offen stehen. Zum einen ko¨nnen die Versorgungsunternehmen
einen relativ gu¨nstigen Brennstoffwechsel von Kohle zu Gas durchfu¨hren. Zum an-
deren ko¨nnen sie von CO2 ausstoßenden Kraftwerken auf kostenintensive - jedoch emis-
sionsfreie - erneuerbare Energien umsteigen. Falls das Wachstum und somit der CO2-
Ausstoß hinreichend niedrig ist, ist der Brennstoffwechsel ausreichend um die Emission-
sobergrenzen einzuhalten. Wird der Emissionshandel jedoch mit einer Mindestquote
fu¨r Erneuerbare kombiniert, so werden die Unternehmen gezwungen die teurere Ver-
meidungsoption nutzen. Anders ausgedru¨ckt entfalten die U¨berlagerungseffekte ihre
Wirksamkeit besonders in Phasen niedrigen Wirtschaftswachstums. Des Weiteren fu¨hrt
der U¨berlagerungseffekt zu einer erho¨hten Sensitivita¨t des CO2-Preises gegenu¨ber Elek-
trizita¨tsnachfragevera¨nderungen. Falls das Wirtschaftswachstum und somit der CO2-
Ausstoß hinreichend groß ist, wird die Quote fu¨r die Nutzung von erneuerbarer Energie
redundant, da die Emissionsobergrenze ohnehin nur mit Hilfe eines Wechsels hin zu
erneuerbaren Energien eingehalten werden kann.
Zwei wesentliche Lektionen lassen sich aus dieser Analyse ableiten: Zum einen fu¨hrt
die Kombination von Emissionsobergrenze und Erneuerbarenquote zu einem gegenu¨ber
wirtschaftlichen Schwankungen sensibleren CO2-Preis. Falls Entscheidungstra¨ger einen
stabilen Preis fu¨r CO2-Zertifikate favorisieren, um z.B. Investitionen in kohlenstoffarme
Technologien anzuregen, kann eine Kombination aus den beiden Politikzielen unbe-
absichtigte negative Konsequenzen mit sich bringen. Zum anderen zeigt sich, dass
eine Kombination aus Emissionsobergrenze und Erneuerbarenquote vor allem dann zu
einem niedrigen CO2-Preis fu¨hrt, wenn das Wirtschaftswachstum niedrig ist. Das fu¨hrt
zu Zusatzkosten insbesondere dann, wenn finanzielle Mittel knapp und die Opportu-
nita¨tskosten von Klimapolitik hoch sind.
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Abstract
Current climate and energy policy has to operate under an ex-ante unforeseen
economic crisis. An obvious consequence is the collapse of prices for carbon emission
allowances as, for example, seen in the European Union. However, this price collapse
may be amplified by the interaction of a carbon emission cap and supplementary pol-
icy targets such as the minimum shares for renewables in the power sector. The static
interaction between climate and renewable policies has been discussed extensively.
This paper extends this debate by analysing how uncertain differences in medium
to long-run growth rates affect the efficiency and effectiveness of a policy portfolio
containing an emission trading scheme and a target for a minimum renewable share.
Making use of a simple partial equilibrium model we identify an asymmetric inter-
action of emissions trading and renewable quotas with respect to different growth
rates of an economy. The results imply that unintended consequences of the policy
interaction may be particularly severe and costly when economic growth is low and
that carbon prices are more sensitive to changes in economic growth if they are
applied in combination with renewable energy targets. Our main example for the
policy interaction is the EU, yet our research also relates particularly well to the
uncertainty of economic growth in fast growing emerging economies like China.
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1 Introduction
Emissions trading is key to climate policy in an increasing number of countries. The pri-
mary example is the European Union’s Emission Trading System (EU ETS). Launched
in 2005, it was the first large carbon emission trading scheme in the world. Thus, it
is also an unprecedented grand scale policy experiment that provides lessons to learn
for the design of subsequent emission trading systems in other countries and regions as
well as about the policy environment they have to operate in. A first major assessment
and adjustment of EU’s climate policy targets for 2020 - based on the three main pillars
of a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, a 20% share of renewables in
EU energy production, and a 20% reduction in energy consumption - has been initiated
by the European Commission (2013) with the publication of the Green Paper on the
EU 2030 climate and energy policy. Herein the Commission asks which targets for 2030
would be most effective and whether there have been “inconsistencies in the current 2020
targets” but also states that the 2030 framework shall reflect “the consequences of the
on-going economic crisis” (p. 2).
Both issues have been discussed in the literature. Several studies show that economic
growth and CO2 emissions are procyclical, i.e., there is a positive relationship between
economic growth and the level of emissions (cf. Narayan et al., 2011, Heutel, 2012,
Doda 2012). Hence, climate policy instruments, which constrain emissions in different
ways, respond differently to fluctuations in economic growth. On the one hand, Fischer
and Springborn (2011) as well as Heutel (2012) show how emissions intensity targets
and emissions trading allow for more flexibility in meeting climate policy goals over
the business cycle compared to a tax and help to stabilise the economy. But on the
other hand, the low carbon prices during an economic downturn may reduce low carbon
investments and the dynamic efficiency of the ETS. Regardless of the drawn conclusion,
it is clear that the sensitivity to changes in economic growth on the performance of
climate policy instruments cannot be ignored in a comprehensive policy assessment.
The question on the interaction of climate and renewable policy targets has also been
discussed by economists before. Bo¨hringer and Rosendahl (2010) show that adding a
target for a minimum renewable share to an existing ETS in the power sector unintention-
ally promotes production by the dirtiest technology. The additional renewables reduce
the abatement pressure on the carbon-emitting technologies and cause a reduction in
the price of emission allowances. This benefits in particular the most emission-intensive
producers.
So far, the two issues have been discussed in isolation of each other. It is the aim
of this paper to combine the insights from the literature on the interaction of climate
and renewable policy targets with those from the literature on the sensitivity of single
climate policy instruments to economic growth. Regarding the latter we focus on uncer-
tain differences in economic growth over the medium to long term instead of short-run
fluctuations over the business cycle. This choice reflects the general policy question of
how to set caps for emissions trading and targets for renewables for commitment periods
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that reach out far in the future like todays discussion about the EU’s 2030 climate policy
targets.
We ask how differences in medium to long-run growth rates affect the efficiency and
effectiveness of a simple climate and energy policy portfolio. We focus on the interaction
of a cap and trade scheme with a target for a minimum renewable share as implemented
in the EU. Our research is guided by the intuition that climate policy instruments may
interact asymmetrically depending realised growth rate of an economy and the respective
demand for electricity.
We model a power sector that has two abatement options. One is a relatively cheap
fuel switch from coal to gas. The other, which is more expensive, is a replacement
of carbon emitting power generation capacities with non-emitting renewables. For the
European case, this assumption is quite reasonable, as it is in line with projections
for future electricity generation costs calculated by the European Commission (Euro-
pean Commission, 2009b).1 If economic growth is low, then emissions are low, and fuel
switch is sufficient to stay below the cap of the ETS. However, if the ETS is combined
with a minimum renewable share target, abatement efforts are forced towards the more
expensive use of renewables. Put differently, the minimum renewable share target be-
comes particularly binding if economic growth is low. As a side effect, comparatively
more energy will be produced with the dirtiest technology when emissions trading and
a renewable share target coexist, compared to a single emissions trading scheme.
Reversely, if economic growth is high, then electricity demand is also high, and the
minimum renewable share target becomes less binding, as energy production by renew-
ables becomes more and more necessary to stay below the emissions cap. If economic
growth is very high the renewable share target may also become completely ineffective,
as the emissions cap is sufficient to force the switch to renewables.
This asymmetric interaction of emissions trading and minimum renewable share tar-
gets bears important policy lessons. Most prominently, it implies that the unintended
consequences of the policy mix, i.e., more renewables energy production foster also more
energy production by the dirtiest policy, may be particularly strong and thus costly if
economic growth is low.
Our main example for the policy interaction is the EU, yet our research also re-
lates particularly well to the uncertainty of economic growth in fast growing emerging
economies like China. Divergences from projected growth rates are likely to be par-
ticularly strong in fast growing countries. Hence, the interactions of emissions trading
with a minimum renewable share targets should also be considered very carefully in fast
growing countries like China.
In the following, we first discuss the existing literature on interactions of climate
1The options for abatement in the electricity sector and the related costs are discussed in detail in
the literature on marginal abatement cost curves (cf. Delarue et al. 2010): Abatement costs are multi
dimensional functions that depend on several factors, such as fuel price ratios, installed capacities, load,
and specific investment costs. For the sake of simplicity we refer to a scenario with two abatement
options that differ in the associated costs.
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policy instruments and climate policy instrument behaviour. Second, we set up a simple
partial equilibrium model for analysing the interaction of emissions trading and a mini-
mum renewable share targets in more detail. Third, we calibrate our model to the EU
in 2030. Thereby we illustrate the economic consequences of the interaction between
emissions trading and renewable share targets for the reference, low and high economic
growth projections of the EU’s Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon econ-
omy in 2050 (European Commission, 2011) and aim to contribute to the assessment of
the EUs 2030 climate policy targets. Fourth, we discuss the interaction of emissions
trading and renewable share targets more broadly. We focus on both, results of the
model and calibration that are expected to generalise, and additional aspects, which
policy makers should take into account when deciding on a climate and energy policy
mix. We conclude with the main policy lessons and a short outlook to future research.
2 Lessons from the Literature
In practice, the goal to mitigate climate change is one of many policy goals. Governments
want to reduce air pollution, take energy security issues into consideration, want to
create jobs and secure international competitiveness. Going back to Tinbergen (1952),
we know that several policy targets need a similar number of instruments. Manifold goal-
setting, as it is the case in the EU’s climate and energy policy, necessitates therefore the
implementation of several regulatory instruments.
Apart from additional policy goals, the occurrence of market failures additional to
the climate externality justifies the implementation of multiple climate and energy policy
instruments (Bennear and Stavins, 2007). For example, market failures - caused by
a lack of credible information or myopic behaviour - may distort incentives to invest
sufficiently into energy efficiency measures. Other market failures may arise due to the
non-consideration of spillovers from accumulated knowledge and learning by doing on
the benefits from new innovations in the energy sector. All this reasons may justify
additional policy instruments.
Following this argument, a considerable amount of literature evolved, that is engaged
with the optimal choice and composition of climate and R&D policy portfolios.2 Recent
studies indicate that a combination of policies to cut emissions and research and devel-
opment subsidies is necessary in order to mitigate climate change at least cost. Fischer
and Newell (2008), Otto et al. (2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2012) show how technol-
ogy externalities and path dependencies in technology choice justify this combination of
subsidies and carbon emission regulation.
In contrast, Bo¨hringer and Rosendahl (2010), Bo¨hringer et al. (2008), Bo¨hringer
et al. (2009), Fankhauser et al. (2010) and Boeters and Koorneef (2011) show that
overlapping regulation may have adverse effects on efficiency and effectiveness of pol-
icy portfolios. Bo¨hringer and Rosendahl (2010) investigate the interference between
2For a comprehensive overview see Goulder and Parry (2008) and Goulder (2013).
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emission and renewable quotas. They demonstrate that overlapping regulation leads to
distortions since renewable quotas lower the price for emissions in a cap and trade system
and thus promote dirty production technologies. These distortions can cause significant
costs: Boeters and Koorneef (2011) show that the renewable share target creates excess
costs of up to 33% depending on the availability of low cost technologies and the strin-
gency of the renewable share target. Using a computable general equilibrium model to
analyze EU climate policy framework for 2020 Bo¨hringer et al. (2009) demonstrates that
implementing several instruments for reaching the emissions goal leads to higher costs.
Only in the presence of market distortions, caused, for example, by market power or
inefficient taxation, overlapping regulation can be justifiable if it reduces the respective
distortions.
Fankhauser et al. (2010) support this finding, by reviewing theoretical implications
for the carbon price due to combinations of emissions trading with other policy instru-
ments. Additional policies promoting renewables undermine the carbon price and are
likely increase costs without reducing emissions. Also unilateral initiatives to cut emis-
sions in countries that are under regulation of a superior international emissions trading
scheme have detrimental consequences. Based on theoretical and numerical analysis
Bo¨hringer et al. (2008) show for the case of the EU ETS that additional national car-
bon taxation is environmentally ineffective and increases overall costs associated with
emission reduction.
A second, very recent, strand of literature is concerned with the policy choice to
mitigate climate change when economic shocks or business cycle fluctuations occur.
Fischer and Springborn (2011) and Heutel (2012) employ dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models to shed light on the mutual relationship between climate policy and
business cycles.
Fischer and Springborn (2011) analyse the cost-effectiveness a carbon tax, emissions
trading, and an intensity target when unexpected shocks to productivity occur. The
intensity target performs best in terms of cost-effectiveness while the emissions trading
scheme leads to the lowest volatility in output. A carbon tax increases volatility.
In contrast to Fischer and Springborn (2011) Heutel (2012) does not consider the
effects of static policies subject to economic shocks. Instead he analyses the optimal
dynamic, i.e. endogenous, climate policy. By way of preliminary empirical analysis he
shows that carbon dioxide emissions evolve pro-cyclically. According to the results of
his theoretical model, optimal endogenous climate policy accounts for this characteristic
by allowing emissions to increase when economic conditions prosper and decrease when
recessions occur. Yet, optimal design of climate policy dampens the pro-cyclicality of
emissions in comparison to the scenario without policy intervention.
Summing up the above discussion of the literature three lessons emerge. First, given
multiple market failures the optimal policy portfolio contains policies that separately
address each market failure. Second, if more than one policy instrument is used to
achieve climate and energy policy goals there is a danger that policy instruments overlap,
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i.e., policies try, at least partly, to achieve the same goal. This overlap makes some
individual policies ineffective and the overall portfolio less efficient. Third, climate policy
instruments are responsive to fluctuations in economic activity. This relationship just
recently caught attention by economists and surely deserves more study.
So far, to our best knowledge, there is no literature that investigates the response of
climate and energy policy portfolios to fluctuations in economic activity. We shed first
light onto this relationship focusing on differences in medium to long-run growth rates
rather than on short term fluctuations. In the following we present a model guiding the
readers enlightenment.
3 A Model of Climate and Energy Policy Interaction
The model describes in a highly stylized fashion the European electricity sector. Elec-
tricity generation is the single largest CO2 emitting sector and responsible for more than
a third of Europe’s CO2 emissions. Our aim is to analyse the interaction of an ETS with
a target for a minimum renewable share regarding uncertain economic growth rates.
The model focuses on the interaction of policies if the future state of the economy differs
from the expected baseline case.
In our analysis we neglect the rationales behind the policies. In the long run re-
newable policies may spur innovation, cause additional cost reductions through learning
effects or might help overcoming technological lock-in effects. Turning the argument on
its head says that the economic costs of those market failures has to be at least as large
as the excess cost from an additional renewable energy portfolio standard overlapping
with an emission trading scheme in order to justify such a regime.
3.1 Model Characteristics
The model distinguishes between three different technologies that generate electricity.
The produced electricity from each source is a homogeneous good and we assume perfect
competition and market clearance in the electricity market. We call the three different
technologies coal, natural gas, and renewables. They are denoted c, g, and r and differ
in their production costs as well as carbon emission intensity.
It is assumed that aggregated production costs per technology are quadratic in output
Ci(qi) = ci1qi + ci2q
2
i /2 for i ∈ {c, g, r} and hence marginal costs are linearly increasing
in output. qi denotes the quantities produced with the respective technology and the
cost parameter c1i and c2i differ by technology. Since we neglect specific fixed costs our
marginal costs represent rather levelized costs, the average costs at which electricity is
generated from a specific source over the lifetime of the project. For a specific technology
the low cost locations are occupied first and an increase in generation capacity is accom-
panied with production at higher cost locations. In general, a reasonable assumption
is then that c2c < c2g < c2r. Apart from costs, electricity generation technologies also
differ in their carbon emission intensity µi with µc > µg > µr = 0. To simplify notation,
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Q denotes total electricity generation Q =
∑
i qi.
Electricity demand is assumed to be linear around the examined area. Inverse de-
mand is described by p(a) = a − Q, where p(a) is the price of electricity. We assume
that a higher GDP, caused by higher economic growth rates in the past, is related to
a higher demand for electricity at a certain price. This is reflected in an outward shift
of the demand curve. Thus, the higher electricity demand caused by higher economic
activity, the greater a. Therefore, total demand and supply in equilibrium depends on
a, so we write Q(a).
Hereafter, we examine three different policy regimes: (i, Single Emissions Cap) a
regime where carbon emissions are capped and abatement efforts are guided by an emis-
sions trading scheme, (ii, Single Renewable Share) a regime in which a requirement is
set that a specific percentage of electricity generation be from renewable sources, and
(iii, Joint Emissions Cap and Renewable Share) a regime where both policies are im-
plemented jointly. The analysis is conducted in two steps: First, we derive analytically
the necessary first order conditions that describe an equilibrium solution and discuss
their characteristics. Second, we calibrate the model to a projection of the European
electricity market in 2030. This enables us to roughly quantify the order of magnitudes
of the examined effects from overlapping policies.
Baseline: No Policy. Our point of departure is the case without any policy target.
This marks our baseline and reference point for the subsequent policy analysis. The
model is based on the principle of profit maximisation in the electricity sector. Profits
in the electricity sector in the absence of any policy intervention are described by
Π = p(a)Q(a)−
∑
i
Ci(qi(a)). (1)
The representative price-taking firm maximises profits with respect to output from
each technology yielding the following first order conditions:
p(a) = c1i + c2iqi(a), ∀i ∈ {c, g, r}, (2)
i.e. each technology is supplied until its increasing marginal costs are equal to the
market price. Since cc < cg < cr, in the baseline equilibrium qc > qg > qr. It is straight
forward to show that equilibrium quantities qi(a) depend linearly on the value of a, the
parameter that proxies the overall level of economic activity.
Single Emissions Cap. Now, let us assume that the regulator limits the total
amount of CO2 the electricity sector is allowed to emit to E¯. We allow for emissions
trading. The cap puts a price tag on carbon emissions generated by fossil fuel technolo-
gies and the only CO2 abatement opportunities depend on fuel switching. We abstract
from intra-technology abatement measures such as an increasing efficiency of the respec-
tive technology. Thus, each unit generated with gas and coal emits CO2 in relation
to its fixed emission intensity µi. Hence, the following policy condition has to hold:
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E¯ ≥ µcqc(a) + µgqg(a). Let us assume that the policy is binding in equilibrium and
emission prices are positive. The market equilibrium can then be characterized by
max
qi
Π = p(a)Q(a)−
∑
i
Ci(qi(a)) + λ1(E¯ − µCqC(a)− µgqg(a)), (3)
where λ1, the shadow price of the emission reduction condition, can be interpreted
as the price of one unit of carbon regulated in an emission market such as the EU ETS.
An interior market equilibrium has to fulfil the following first order conditions:
p(a) = c1i + c2jqj(a) + λ1µj ∀j ∈ {c, g}, (4)
p(a) = c1r + c2rqr(a), (5)
E¯ = µcqc(a) + µgqg(a), (6)
where j refers to the set of non-renewable technologies. The binding cap E¯ on CO2
emissions increases the costs of gas- and coal-fired technologies and reduces generated
quantities for a given electricity price relative to the baseline. Coal-fired generation,
which has the largest CO2 intensity, is confronted with the largest additional costs per
unit of production causing the largest reduction in output. In contrast, renewables be-
come relatively cheaper and increase their share in the total electricity mix. However,
the stringency of the policy depends crucially on the economic activity. If E¯ is close to
the emissions realised under a low a, the emission constraint is less stringent. This is
reflected in a low shadow price for CO2 that causes only limited changes in the compo-
sition of the electricity sector. However, if a is large, the fixed emission constraint gets
particularly stringent. The high CO2 price then leads to a higher reduction of coal and
less enlargement of renewable equilibrium quantities.
Single Renewable Share. Next, we turn our attention to the case where the
regulator sets only a minimum share R¯ of renewables in the total quantity of generated
electricity. Such targets related to minimum percentages can be achieved with renewable
portfolio standards or “green certificate” schemes. qr = R¯Q denotes the restriction on the
technology use. Accordingly, the market equilibrium can be described by the following
optimisation problem:
max
qi
Π = p(a)Q(a)−
∑
i
Ci(qi(a)) + λ2(qr(a)− R¯Q(a)). (7)
λ2 describes the shadow price for the use of non-renewables and can also be in-
terpreted as price for green certificates that are traded in the framework of renewable
portfolio standards. The first order conditions of the problem are
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p(a) = cjqj(a) + λ2R¯ ∀j ∈ {c, g}, (8)
p(a) = crqr(a)− λ2(1− R¯), (9)
qr(a) = R¯Q(a), (10)
where j refers to the set of non-renewable technologies. Since both non-renewable
technologies have to cope with the same additional costs, their share decreases by the
same amount on the extent of the fostered renewables.
Joint Emissions Cap and Renewable Share Last, we derive the equilibrium
describing the situation, in which both policies are implemented simultaneously. Here
we impose both restrictions on the use of renewables and the discharged emissions as
defined above. Note that now the overlap of policies may cause cases where one of the
two policies is not binding. Thus, we characterize the market equilibrium as a Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker problem:
max
qi
Π = p(a)Q(a)−
∑
i
Ci(qi(a))+λ1(E¯−µcqc(a)−µgqg(a))+λ2(qr(a)−R¯Q(a)).(11)
First order conditions and complementary slackness are described by
p(a) = cjqj(a) + λ1µj + λ2R¯ ∀j ∈ {c, g}, (12)
p(a) = crqr(a)− λ2(1− R¯), (13)
0 = λ1(E¯ − µcqc(a)− µgqg(a)), (14)
0 = λ2(qr(a)− R¯Q(a)). (15)
Note that the corner solutions, where one policy makes the other obsolete, are equiv-
alent to the cases presented above. For situations, when the demand for electricity
is sufficiently high, the renewable quota is obsolete: The emissions cap can only be
achieved with a share of renewables higher than the renewable quota. For situations,
when the demand for electricity is sufficiently low, the emissions cap is not binding, but
the renewable quota definitely is.
3.2 Calibration to the European electricity sector
We aim to make use of the insights generated by our model and shed light onto the
efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed EU’s climate and energy strategy for post-
2020. Thus, we apply the theoretical model discussed above to a stylised calibrated
representation of the electricity sector in the EU and analyse the interaction of a policy
portfolio that combines an emission reduction target with a minimum renewable share
target under different states of economic activity.
Since we aim to discuss the consequences of political decisions on targets done today
on future states of the European electricity market when growth paths are uncertain, we
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P0 Price of electricity (EUR/MWh) 95 EC (2009)
c2c Slope supply curve coal (EUR/MWh
2) 5.024×10−9 EC (2009)
c2g Slope supply curve gas (EUR/MWh
2) 7.370×10−9 EC (2009)
c2r Slope supply curve renewables (EUR/MWh
2) 8.840×10−9 EC (2009)
µc CO2 intensity coal-fired (tCO2/MWh) 0.915 IEA (2012)
µg CO2 intensity gas-fired (tCO2/MWh) 0.391 IEA (2012)
The values are either calibrated to the Reference scenario values of 2030 in “EU energy trends to 2030”
(European Commission, 2009b) or taken from “CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion Statistics” (IEA, 2012).
Table 1: Parameter values used for calibration.
calibrate our model to the year 2030. Reasonable policy targets are derived from EU’s
long-term aspirational targets outlined in the “Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive
Low Carbon Economy in 2050” (European Commission, 2011). To be roughly consistent
with the pathway outlined in this Roadmap, we assume an emission reduction of 40 per
cent and an envisaged share of Renewables in the electricity sector of 40 per cent.
The model is calibrated to 2030 in a constructed no policy scenario based on on the
Reference scenario of the “EU energy trends for 2030” (European Commission, 2009b).
The Reference scenario reflects the current economic downturn. Medium and long term
growth projections follow the baseline scenario of the 2009 Aging Report (European
Commission, 2009a), which assumes between 2020 and 2030 annual GDP growth rates
of 1.7 per cent. The cost function is calibrated such that c1i = P0. The slope of the
supply curve c2i is derived by comparing quantities and prices in the Reference scenario
with the Baseline 2009 scenario, similar to Fischer and Newell (2008). CO2 intensity
coefficients are taken from IEA (2012). Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameters.
We focus in our numerical analysis on the three technologies specified above. In order to
be consistent with total generated and demanded quantities we include nuclear and hydro
generation but fix their quantities on the 2030 level in the Reference scenario arguing
that those technologies have much longer planning horizons and are rather insensitive
to the discussed mid-term policy targets and changes in GDP growth rates.
In the following, we run the above outlined four different scenarios (baseline, single
carbon policy, single renewable policy, and a scenario where the two targets are jointly
in placed) with our calibrated model.
4 Results
Table 2 shows the prices and generated quantities in 2030 under the different policy
regimes if economic growth follows the reference scenario growth assumptions. A single
emissions cap (Single Cap) leads to a price of 10 EUR/tCO2 for a carbon emission
allowance and affect coal generation the most where generation reduces by 42 per cent
relative to the baseline case without policy. Gas-fired generations is slightly increasing,
whereas renewables increase their production by 76 per cent leading to a total share
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Baseline Single Cap Single RES Joint
PC Price CO2 (EUR/tCO2) 10.0 8.14
PR Price RES-E (EUR/MWh) 7.74 2.02
qc Coal Generation (MWh) 1.35×109 5.77×108 9.66×108 6.21×108
qg Gas Generation (MWh) 9.24×108 1.11×109 6.58×108 1.01×109
qr RES-E Generation (MWh) 7.70×108 1.36×109 1.42×109 1.42×109
qb Base Generation (MWh) 1.02×109 1.02×109 1.02×109 1.02×109
Table 2: Prices and generation levels under the different scenarios.
of renewables in the single cap case of 31 per cent. Note that our stylized model,
where the only abatement options are fuel switches and renewable energy in the power
sector, overestimates the burden of the emissions cap. In reality also other sectors with
eventually lower abatement costs are included in the emission reduction efforts.
In the scenario with a single renewable share (Single RES) both coal and gas based
technologies reduce their generation proportionally. The price of the respective green
certificate (RES-E) is 7.74 EUR/MWh.
The joint emissions cap and renewable share regime (Joint) leads to lower prices for
CO2 and green certificates when compared to the single policy regimes. The reason
is that in the joint emissions cap and renewable share regime both policies overlap
and substitute each other. The lower CO2 price promotes in particular the dirtiest
technology, coal, and leads to higher coal generation compared to the case with a single
emissions cap. Note that the joint emissions cap and renewable share regime makes
compliance with the emission target more expensive since the emissions alone could have
been mitigated by a less costly fuel switch from coal to gas without generating higher
quantities of rather expensive renewables. Those results correspond to the findings of
Bhringer and Rosendahl (2010) and others. However, the question remains how the
interaction changes if total economic activity and therefore total demand for electricity
changes.
Figure 1 illustrates how the price signals of the regulation changes if total demand for
electricity changes. According to the “EU Energy Trends to 2030” (European Commis-
sion, 2009b) Reference scenario gross electricity generation is 4073 TWh in 2030. The
“Energy Roadmap” also contains a Low GDP Growth Scenario based on the Reference
Scenario but with 0.4 percentage points lower GDP growth. This leads to a demand for
gross electricity generation of 3848 TWh in 2030. In its High GDP Growth Scenario
assuming 0.4 percentage points higher GDP growth, gross electricity demand increases
to 4289 TWh in 2030.
The upper schedule shows how the CO2 price responds to changes in demand. The
price for the CO2 certificate is shown for two cases: First, for a single emissions cap
(red continuous line), and second for the joint emissions cap and renewable share regime
(blue dashed line). The lower schedule shows the price of the green certificate for a single
renewable share (continuous red line), and the joint emissions cap and a renewable share
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The upper panel shows the price of CO2 if implemented as single policy or in combination with a renewable
share over a range of electricity demand levels. The lower panel shows the price of a green certificate if
implemented as single policy or in combination with a CO2 emissions cap over a range of electricity demand
levels.
Figure 1: Prices of CO2 and green certificates.
regime (blue dashed line).
In the single emissions target regime, the CO2 price increases continuously in demand.
Yet, below a certain minimum level of demand the CO2 price is zero. In this case, demand
and corresponding emissions are so low that no abatement efforts are necessary to fulfil
the target.
In case of a single renewable share the price of the renewable certificate behaves in
an analogue fashion. The only difference is that the price of the renewable certificate is
positive for any positive demand level since a higher quantity of renewable energy than
in baseline needs to be generated, no matter the overall level of demand.
In the combined policy regime, both the behaviour of the CO2 certificate price and
the green certificate price change. Compared to the single emissions emissions cap the
CO2 price stays much longer at zero as demand increases. The intuition is that the
renewable share requires energy production by renewables that have zero emissions. This
leads to an overall reduction in emissions and keeps the emissions cap non-binding for
comparatively higher levels of demand. Without target for a renewable share, a switch
from coal to gas would have been necessary to keep emissions below the cap resulting in
a positive price for CO2.
From a level of demand above 3650 TWh we observe a positive CO2 price also in
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Low GDP Reference High GDP
Excess Cost [EUR] 1.1 bn 450 m 0
Table 3: Excess costs evaluated with policy prices in the respective scenarios.
the joint policy regime, which increases in demand. Note that the CO2 price change
is now steeper than with the single emissions cap. This is an important corollary from
our analysis. It shows that the CO2 emission price reacts more sensitive to changes in
demand for electricity if combined with an renewable share. Thus, the combination of
both targets leads to higher uncertainty about the profitability of low-carbon investments
if electricity demand is uncertain.
Even if demand increases, the CO2 emission limit stays the same. So, either a fuel
switch from coal to gas is required, or the more demand increases, an additional switch
to renewables is needed. In turn, the price of the renewables certificate drops. The
CO2 certificate is now a substitute for the green certificate. The more emissions are
constrained by the fixed cap the more generation by renewables is needed to stay below
the cap regardless of the renewable share target. From a total energy demand of about
4280 TWh onward the green certificate reaches a price of zero, the renewable share target
is not binding anymore and the outcome corresponds to a case with a single emissions
cap.
These results indicate that the additional costs from the overlapping targets vary over
the level of economic activity and the respective GDP growth rates. Following Boeters
and Koornneef (2011) we calculate excess costs of the overlapping regulations. We define
excess costs as the additional costs caused by the renewable share target if combined
with a CO2 emissions cap. Then, we compare the case where the two targets are jointly
implemented with the single emissions cap case evaluated at prices of the joint target
case. Hence, excess costs are EXC = pjointr (qr(a)
joint − qr(a)ets) − pjointC (qg(a)joint −
qg(a)
ets), which are the costs of the additional generation in renewables due to the
renewable share minus the costs from saved emission abatement efforts in the cheaper
abatement option. Table 3 shows the excess costs for the Low GDP, the Reference
Scenario, and the High GDP Scenario as outlined above. Under the Low GDP Scenario,
when the renewable share target is particularly binding, those excess costs are 1.1 bn
EUR, compared to costs of 450 m EUR in the Reference case. In the High GDP case,
the renewable share target is not binding anymore and hence excess costs are zero. All in
all, our analysis implies that a costly interaction between an emissions trading scheme
co-existing with an renewable share target is particularly costly for low GDP growth
rates.
Summing up the above discussion four main lessons emerge from this analysis: First,
with the additional renewable share target the CO2 price is comparatively lower as long
as the renewable share target is binding. Second, if combined with a renewable share the
CO2 price responds more sensitive to changes in electricity demand and approaches zero
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faster for low levels of economic growth. In current debates on the future of the EU ETS,
several mechanisms to stabilise prices are discussed. The results of our model imply that
removing the additional renewable share would foster price stabilisation and limit the
range of CO2 certificate price fluctuations. Third, for high levels of demand the renewable
share target becomes non-binding and thus irrelevant. Fourth, with low and medium
GDP growth and corresponding electricity demand levels more energy is produced both
by coal and by renewables compared to the single emissions cap. This increases the
excess costs of the energy mix, since more cost-efficient abatement options cannot be
exploited, and makes CO2 abatement particularly expensive when GDP growth rates
are low.
5 Discussion
Our model presents a very stylized view on the interaction of emissions trading and re-
newable share targets. It helps to easily identify the mechanisms at work when economic
growth turns out to be higher or lower than expected. Yet, the real world is more com-
plex. In the following we discuss in a less rigorous but more realistic way what should
be kept in mind when drawing policy lessons from our model.
We see the main simplifications of our model in first, restricting the energy supply to
only three technologies. Second, we do not take into account positive externalities that
arise from research and development in and deployment of renewable energies. Third,
our approach does not allow for taking potential myopia of investors into the energy
sector into account. Fourth, while we focus on the interaction between emissions trading
and a renewable share target we do not take into account that a lot of countries, also in
the European context, have actually introduced feed-in tariffs for renewables instead of
an explicit renewable share target. In the following we discuss the implications of our
simplifications turn in turn.
Limiting the technologies for energy production to three options is surely a simpli-
fication. In reality there are way more technologies, and there are as well significant
differences within each separate group of technologies like coal, gas, and renewables.
However, limiting our analyses to the three technologies above is actually not a very
harsh assumption. The main implication of our analysis regarding technology is the
following: A renewable share crowds out energy production by non-renewable technolo-
gies, of which at least some, can provide the same level of abatement at lower costs.
The renewable share limits the available abatement options. This implication still holds,
even if we increase the options of available technologies. Hence, the limitation to three
technologies is merely a model simplification to keep results tractable. The policy im-
plication regarding technology choice of our model is, that the addition of a renewable
share to an ETS crowds out energy production by relatively clean fossil sources and
increases the amount of more dirty energy production by fossil fuels.
In our model we abstract from positive externalities that result from research and
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development of renewables as well as from their deployment. We deliberately did not
model these benefits to focus on the pure interaction of an emission trading scheme
and a renewable share target for varying levels of economic activity. Thereby we could
show that the unintended and costly interaction of an ETS with a target for a minimum
renewable share is particularly strong when economic growth is low. This result should
hold in general independent of the societal benefits that innovation in and adoption of
renewable energy sources provide.
Yet, our results in general may be biased against the benefits of a renewable share
target. An optimal policy mix in the real world does surely require that inventors
and adopters of renewable energy technologies are compensated fully for the societal
benefits that they provide. Given our results of the costly interaction between emissions
trading and renewable share targets our research thus calls for investigating additional
possibilities to reward innovators and renewable energy adopters that interfere less with
emissions trading. Such measures could be, for example, direct support for research
and development, prizes for developing renewable energy technologies, and/or adopting
renewables energy technologies. The costs and benefits of these options are surely worth
studying.
Our simple model does not allow for investigating the effects of potential myopia
by investors into the energy infrastructure. Given the highly uncertain future of both
climate policies and the energy prices investors may indeed focus on fairly short time
horizons and not take the full time horizon of their investment decision into account. An
important problem that evolves from this myopia is that what pays off today with low
carbon prices may not pay off tomorrow with the high carbon prices which are needed
to achieve the political agreed goal of a maximum expected warming by two degrees
Celsius. Investments may easily be sunk. An argument in favour for renewable share
targets is thus that they help avoiding sunk investments in energy generation by fossil
fuels. However, one should keep in mind that the speed of how fast the investment costs
for renewable energy production decline is also uncertain. Hence, there is also a risk of
over- or underinvestment with a renewable share target. Furthermore, our model shows
that a renewable share target, which is added to an emissions trading scheme distorts
the price of CO2 certificates by forcing it towards zero. Thus, investors that rely on
the price of CO2 certificates for deciding in which technology to invest may actually
underinvest in low carbon technologies due to CO2 certificate price depression caused
by the renewable share target.
Many governments make actually use of feed-in tariffs instead of renewable share
targets. Explicitly modelling the interaction of an emissions trading scheme with feed-in
tariffs may actually reveal additional insights. In general we would expect the same
logic to apply. The feed-in tariffs incentivize renewable energy production no matter the
overall demand for energy production while the emissions trading scheme provide more
incentives the higher the level of energy demand. In combination with emissions trading,
feed in tariffs will hardly be effective when economic growth turns out to be higher than
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expected while they depress the price of CO2 certificates even further if growth turns
out to be lower than expected.
In addition, feed-in tariffs seem particularly attractive when economic growth is low
since their fixed returns then become comparatively more attractive. Thus there is a
relative increase in renewable supply if economic growth is low, which leads the price
for CO2 certificates to drop even faster. Regarding policy, the lesson is that no matter
whether a renewable share target or an feed-in tariff is applied in addition to an emissions
trading scheme the unintended and costly side effects of their interactions are particularly
strong when economic growth is low.
Above we discussed how the results of our model relate to reality. No matter which
assumption we relax the main result, that unintended and costly interactions between
emissions trading and renewable share targets are particularly strong if economic growth
is low, still holds. In addition one should consider that the declining marginal utility of
income also implies that our model rather touches at the lower cost level of these adverse
interaction effects.
6 Conclusion
We examine the interaction between climate and renewable policies if there is uncertainty
about future economic growth rates - and as a consequence uncertainty about the demand
for electricity. By means of a calibrated stylized model we analyze the effect of exogenous
changes in electricity demand on the prices for emission allowances and renewable credits.
Two main lessons can be derived from this analysis:
First, prices for emission allowances become more sensitive to changes in electricity
demand if the ETS is combined with an instrument that aims for a minimum renewable
share. If policy makers value a clear and stable carbon price signal as crucial for encour-
aging investments in low-carbon technologies the combination of the two policy targets
may have unintended negative consequences.
Second and following from our first lesson, we can show that while the carbon price
is always lower if an ETS is combined with a renewable quota, this gap is particularly
pronounced if economic growth is low. This leads to additional excess costs during
situations when funds are particularly scarce and opportunity costs of climate policies
are particularly high.
These lessons hold generally, i.e., for improving existing emission trading schemes
like the EU ETS as well as for new and emerging ETS like those in China. The second
lesson bears particular importance for fast growing emerging economies that plan to
implement climate policies but are confronted with a lot of uncertainty regarding future
growth rates. If economic growth turns out to be lower than expected the interaction
between emissions trading and a target for a minimum renewable share turns out to be
particularly costly. These costs should be weighted against the benefits of the deployment
of renewables due to knowledge spillovers that justify their support.
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We believe that this study opens a fruitful avenue of future research. While we anal-
ysed the interaction between climate and renewable policies if there uncertainty about
future economic growth rates in the medium to long-term, it would also be worthwhile to
gain a better understanding on how climate policy instruments interact in the short-term
over explicitly modelled business cycles.
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